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Introduction 
Marketing quotas have errerged during the decade of the seventies as a 
major instrument of Canadian agricultural policy. This is partly due to the 
increased fornation of farm marketing boardsl in general, but more inportantly, 
to the increased nuITber of boards which have acquired the power to restrict 
output or manage aggregate supply. The increased willingness of the government 
to grant these powers (and their attendant instrument of control, marketing 
quotas) reflects its desire to pay farmers higher prices yet avoid incurring 
costly and errbarrassing surpluses of farm products. However, one effect of 
these supply restrictions corrbined with regulated prices is the difficulty in 
ooserving and estimating the actual supply curve. This leads to difficulty in 
determining the economic effects of the regulation, such as how resource 
allocation is being altered and how nuch income is being transferred from 
consumers to producers. 
This problem exists roore widely than in the supply managed (i.e., dairy 
and poultry) sectors of Canadian agriculture. It arises whenever aggregate 
market supply is restricted by a quota and not determined by individual 
producer behavior, effectively preventing the industry supply price from being 
c:bserved at the margin of production. Some exanples include the Israeli dairy 
and poultry industries, the English hop and potato industries and the 
*A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Canadian 
Economics Association annual n-eeting in Vancouver, B.C., June 1983•. 
Due to its gradual evolution, this paper has benefitted from the 
corrments of many people, including workshop participants at Maryland, 
Minnesota, U.B.C. and Yale, but I would particularly like to thank Rebert 
Allen, Jonathan F.aton, Daniel Gordon, John Graham, Herbert Grubel, Michel 
Patry, Anthony Scott and John Strauss. Responsibility for remaining errors 
rests, of course, with me. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada provided partial financial support for this research 
which is gratefully acknowledged. 
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Australian dairy industry.2 Although marketing boards are prevalent in some 
'!he rrarketing boards which provide the basis for this analysis can be described 
as prQducer cartels where a monopoly solution may be sought and where the 
proceeds of the roonopoly tax goes to holders of the quota (e.g., the 
producers). 
Unlike the i.rrport quotas so conmonly found in parts of the foreign 
trade sector these agricultural quotas are held by a large nurrber of firms and 
they are often traded in markets with ooservable prices. It is the oojective 
of this paper to show that when this quota market data is cotrbined with 
institutional details such as pricing and,quota allocation rules much can often 
be disclosed about aggregate supply prices and the economic effects of the 
regulation. 
It should be made clear at the outset, that we are concerned with 
marketing quotas which are defined in terms of production, and which can 
usually be purchased or somehow ootained in an incremental fashion. The crux 
of the natter is that the purchase or sale of this asset is a marginal 
decision, determined by the usuai criteria at the margin of production. This 
is in contrast to a license restriction, where entry to the industry is 
conditional upon the acquisition of a license, yet output is not restricted by 
the license. -ihe distinction is irrportant for the exercise undertaken in this 
paper, because the .quota will attract only marginal rents whereas the license 
will attract inframarginal rents. 
Although it is not new to use quota stock prices to infer output supply 
prices, the steps incorporated here represent an increase. in conplexity over 
the procedure usually followed. -ihe standard treatment in analyzing quota 
prices is to nultiply the stock value by a current nominal interest rate to 
d:>tain the annual rent. In fact, the research reported here has been largely 
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rootivated by serious shortcomings of this procedure cbserved in applying it to 
the British Colurrbia dairy industry. For exanple, the sta-:3ard treabnent 
" 
provided no explanation for the rapid increase in B.C. milk quota values in the 
1975-76 period (see Appendix 1). In several jurisdictions, notably both the 
B.C. egg and milk industries, it is difficult to rationally explain or 
conprehend currently high levels of quota values.using the standard roodel. 
Finally, in talking to individual farmers and agricultural bankers, references 
to capital gains from the quota and a brief "payback period" are comm::mly made, 
yet there is no systematic consideration of these factors in the standard 
IOOdel. 
The JOOdel reported in this paper rep~esents an atterrpt to analyze quo­
tas roore realistically, drawing on well developed procedures for valuing other 
financial assets such as comrron stocks. Although attention is given to the 
potentially inportant factor of quota returns additional to current production 
rents (e.g., capital gains), it is the risk associated with ·quotas that is 
particularly inportant. - We suggest that one part of this risk is the 
possibility that government policy will change, reducing the regulation=ereatec1 
rents of the quota system, and that this is an inportant corrponent of the 
unusually large apparent discount rates (earnings/price ratios) which are 
cbserved. An application of these procedures is rrade to the B.C. dairy 
industry with the cbjective of more accurately estirrating the supply price of 
milk. 
Analysis 
Standard treatments of this quota (Arcus, Grubel and Schwindt, Veeman) 
usually feature two steps. The industry equilibrium is described by Fig. 1, 
with industry output restricted from an unregulated Oe to the restricted level 
Q.3 This creates a wedge between the derrand price P and the supply 
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price C, measured by the rent, R. Secondly, the quota is assumed to take on a 
value equal to the discounted stream of these rents. When this stream occurs 
in perpetuity, the price of quota Po is sinply equal to R/r where r is the rate 
of interest. 
Unfortunately, few investments or capital assets are accurately 





common stock prices, their determinants are specified in a valuation model, 
(e ..g., Elton and Gruber; 1981, p. 397), the most theoretically attractive and 
widely used of which is.the net present value or discounted cash flow model. 
Accordingly, financial assets such as stocks are generally valued and, with 
corrpetition, priced as the present value of the stream of net returns accruing 






where Po= price of a unit of asset 
Fi= net return or benefit from one unit of the asset in period i 
ri = interest rate in period i 
N = expected life of the asset. 
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Although general, this equation makes onerous infornational derrands for 
an asset of any reasonable life. 'Ibis is true for the stock analyst, the 
farmer conterrplating quota purchase or sale and the econanist trying to analyze 
the industry. Some si.rrplification is necessary, and one possible response is 
to assume a constant level over tine of both the discount rate and the net 
returns. In terms of the farm investor this is equivalent to using an expected 
average long run discount rate and net return in his valuation of the quota, a 
reasonable formulation given the uncertainties facing a prospective quota 
market participant. The value equation then becomes 
N F 
Po= I: 1
i-=o (1 + r) 
(2) 
This sirrplification is very helpful for analysis of the asset because 
now the quota investment can be treated as an annuity. When Fi =F and r i =·r, 
the net present value equation can be solved for one of Po, F, r, or N when the 
other three are known. '!he farmer in his quota purchase decision essentially 
solves for Po, given his known or calculated values for the other three, the 
familiar stock valuation problem. However, the economist wishing to determine 
the economic effects of this regulation faces a different problem. Because the 
quota asset often trades as a stock but is not usually rented, the market price 
of quota (Po) can be observed and the rental price nornally cannot. After the 
determination of N and r, however, one can calculate the net returns, F, and 
subsequently the supply price, C. This describes the general strategy of the 
paper• 
What we obtain from this procedure is an estima.te of a point on the 
industry supply curve. More specifically, it is the supply price of the subset 
of farmers who are trading quota, the relevant aggregate ma.rgin of production. 
'Ibis method does not provide the slope or elasticity of the supply curve. 
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Because that information rrust be provided from other methods and data we cannot 
determine the unregulated industry equilibrium solely from analyzing quota 
price data. We can also interpret this supply price estimate as being drawn 
from the long run supply curve. 'Ibis is suggested by the nature of the quota 
purchase or sale decision as a capital decision, and this interpretation.. is 
strengthened by the five-year prohibition on the resale of quota observed in 
the British Colunbia dairy industry. Finally, although it may be attractive to 
assume that this supply price enbodies the usual profit-maximizing conditions, 
the only condition we actually assurre is that farmers rraxirnize profit with 
respect to their quota purchase or sale decision, equalizing the demand price 
for quota across farms (footnotes 9 and 10 elaborate). 
Before enpirically applying such a sinplified. present value model as 
(2) directly to agricultural quotas, two issues remain to be addressed. First, 
we IIUst determine whether the marginal rents, R of Figure 1, exhaust the flow 
returns, F, which determine the quota stock price. Secondly, following casual 
observations that these quotas are "risky" assets we IIUst consider whether this 
risk is appropriately captured in the discount rate and how it can be measured. 
Be~.:.to -the Q.lota 
Qle feature of agricultural quotas is the likelihocxl that current 
production rents do not provide a conplete account of the expected annual net 
returns which determine the stock price. Just as the ownership of a cornm?n 
stock may yield both dividends and capital gains, so may the ownership of a 
quota. In the former case, when a firm does not distribute all earnings as 
dividends, future dividends, hence share prices, can be expected to grow at 
some rate, g, from the reinvestment of retained earnings. As this becomes 
expected, capitalization into the stock value occurs. 
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In the case of agricultural quotas, production rents may also be ex­
pected to grow over time, even in real terms. This is due to the likelihood of 
continued technical change in the production of the cormodity conbined with the 
particular pricing methods which have become institutionalized. Pricing is 
often determined by a cost-based fornula which fails to capture fully the 
technical inproverrepts being adopted at the econanic margin of production and 
which is revised infrequently enough to fail to capture ioost input 
substitution. The net result of these fornulae is an upward-biased measure and 
growth ~ate of costs, hence prices which grow to systematically increase 
pre>duction rents as long as these conditions continue. In markets where they 
are d:>served and expected to continue, quotas will continue to increase in 
value and this expectation of capital gains will be capitalized. One rnethod of 
incorporating these expectations is to reduce the discount rate by the expected 
growth rate, g, IOOdifying the value equation to (3), 
N F 
PQ = !: ----1 
i=o (1 + r-g) 
where g = the expected rate of growth in the price of quota or the production 
' 
rent. Only if we ignore the existence of capital gains will this analysis 
yield the biased results suggested in Schmitz (1983). 
Our interpretation of capital gains from quota ownership nust be broad 
enough to enconpass ioore than price appreciation of the asset. It is often 
necessary to add new quota to the system to accomroodate demand growth and this 
is sometimes accorrplished, at least in part, by giving new quantity allocations 
to existing holders of the quota. Because demand growth precedes this increased 
supply of quota, dilution of stock value does not occur, and as loD3 as indi­
vidual holders of the stock are given at least some of the new issue, it can be 
handled analytically as a capital gain. Of critical inportance for the 
analysis is the usual rule by which new quota is allocated to existing holders. 
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A proportional allocation, expected to add one percent per annum to a farrrer's 
quantity of quota, is equivalent to an additional expected annual capital gain 
of one percent, and this consideration can be incorporated in equation (3) by 
adjusting the value of g.4 
'!his discussion of net returns is corrplete only if current production 
rents and capital gains exhaust the benefits of quota ownership. However there 
would appear to be another benefit included in F which accrues to purchasers of 
quota and is due to the tax system. Those who purchase quota may deduct from 
income an allowance for depreciation of the quota (essentially a capital cost 
allowance), even though quota does not depreciate in the usual sense and in 
fact typically appreciates in value. 'Ibis tax advantage does not last forever, 
as it is "recaptured" in capital gains taxation upon eventual sale. It is in 
essence an interest-free loan which grows as depreciation is clairred and con­
tinues until the quota is sold. 
'!he present value of this tax advantage per dollar of purchased quota, 
including both the benefits from tax deductions during quota ownership and the 
cost of paying back those deductions upon eventual sale (recapture), is given 
by TS (tax savings) in equation (4) 
0 9TS • ~ [1 - .!::f ] - [1-(1-f)n] (4)f+p l+p (1-p)n 
where: f = allowed rate of depreciation 
8 = effective marginal tax rate 
P = nominal discount rate of quota purchaser 
n = expected holding period 
'Ibis present value of the tax advantage from quota ownership represents 
the extra amount a profit-maximizing purchaser would be willing to pay for each 
dollar of quota bought. Rather than translate this into an artificially con­
stant annual flow as part of F (equation 3) it can be used directly to deflate 
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the observed market price (which already includes TS). F,quation (3) can then 
be written with R, the production rent, substituted for F ?:'1d with the market 
price, Po, having been appropriately adjusted. 
Beneficiaries of supply control regimes often suggest that additional 
benefits are conferred on quota holders. A ntmber of these benefits may in 
fact flow from the regulatory regime, and taken collectively, they can form the 
basis for some value placed by producers on belonging to the regulatory regime 
or cartel. However, one relevant question is whether these benefits are margi­
nal or inframarginal in nature. The producer purchasing incremental quota, who 
is already a member of the cartel, enjoying the stability and predictability of 
price, a certain narket for his product, and so forth, will not pay more for 
those "environmental" benefits which he receives regardless of whether he buys 
quota or not. The value of belonging to the cartel is the sum of all 
inframarginal rents enjoyed by the narginal producer relative to the rents he 
-would enjoy in an unregulated regime. This would enter his demand price for a 
license, as discussed earlier. Alternatively, in a situation with no licensing 
as such, it would determine how many resources a producer would be willing to 
spend to lobby the government to preserve the regulatory regime. It would have 
no effect on his denand for incrernental quota, where only narginal costs and 
benefits apply.5 
However, this is not to deny that some features of the marketing board 
regime nay have shifted the industry supply curve. It is possible that the 
board causes producer prices to be more stable and this nay have effectively 
lowered farm costs, shifting the industry supply curve to the right.6 In this 
case, these new supply conditions form the basis for farm decision-making and 
the supply price revealed by analyzing quota prices is along the "new" 
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supply curve. Being unable with current data to estimate the "old" supply 
curve we can identify neither the sign nor the size of the net effect of the 
board. Even if these effects were measured, they should not be added to the 
quota's net returns because they are already inplicit in ci:>served quota prices. 
'lbe Discount ·Rate and :Q.Jota Risk 
Choosing an appropriate interest rate to discount future returns 
necessarily involves considering the risk associated with the asset. This 
rreans determining the level of returns additional to the risk-free return 
(i.e., the "risk premium") which is necessary to conpensate holders of this 
asset for the risk expected from it. The risk of an asset is usually rreasured 
by the prci:>able dispersion (variance) of its future returns and deconposed into 
systematic (market-related) and unsystematic (firm-specific} portions. With 
perfect capital markets, the market valuation of this risk depends on the 
extent of the systematic risk (the asset's "ll" value), or on the variance and 
covariances of its returns with those of alternative assets. 
There is no ·question that the outcomes associated with agricultural 
quotas are uncertain. Net returns vary, sometimes substa11tially; for all the 
reasons one might expect in an agricultural enterprise. In the dairy industry, 
for exanple, net returns fluctuate with weather (e.g., crop and milk yield), 
biological factors (e.g., herd health, reproductive success and milk yield), 
input and output price changes and newly available inputs (technology} • In 
turn, these sources of variance in expected returns can be classified into 
systematic and unsystematic risk corrponents, just as can be done with the 
variance of a stock's returns. 
Recent experience in the Canadian dairy industry suggests that at least 
part of the variance in net returns in that industry is systematic. The 
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increase in real interest rates in the early 1980's affected this industry like 
many others: reductions in net cash flow, some bankruptcies and a notable fall 
in real quota prices (Appendix 1). The ensuing recession in 1982-1983 led to 
unexpected reductions in scheduled industrial milk price increases. Demand 
growth for many dairy products also fell over this period, resulting in 
industrial milk quota reductions at the farm level. 
Bearing in mind that a unit of quota is like a share in the stock of 
the dairy industry, unsystematic risk arises from farm and industry-specific 
' 
sources. These can include rrost of the factors listed above, and arguably 
unsystematic risk is the larger corrponent of the total variance in expected 
returns. This risk is diversifiable and with well-functioning capital markets 
and unrestricted quota trade, no risk premium from this source should be 
demanded by the market, hence included in the discount rate. Lerner and 
Stanbury (1983) make this argument and cor,duct their enpirical work 
accordingly. 
In practice, this position may be too strong because there appear to be 
some inpediments to corrplete diversification. First, ~'lere are a variety of 
quota transfer restrictions which vary by jurisdiction and do appear to 
effectively reduce transactions. This exacerbates the problem of "thin" 
markets which already affect a nunber of jurisdictions (e.g., the poultry 
industry in Western Canada). Second, the size of typical asset holdings in 
some quota-controlled industries (e.g., the B.C. dairy industry) are well in 
excess of a million dollars. The absolute size of a diversified asset 
portfolio may force some farms to remain incorrpletely diversified unless they 
issue shares, at least given present capital markets. And _widely-held 
{non-family) share issue is often prevented by board regulations. 
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In sum, even though there would appear to be less than average 
systematic risk in holding these quotas, hence a small risk premium, there may 
be some market premium for bearing unsystematic risk due to incorrplete 
diversification. Although we do not presently have the data to measure it, we 
conclude that the appropriate discount rate should incorporate some rrodest 
premium for this familiar (variance, covariance4)ased) type of risk. 
However, there is a less comrron feature of these agricultural quotas 
which indeed contributes much risk and this relates to the regulated structure 
of the industry. Because the size of the net returns and the existence of the 
quota itself are conditional upon government-granted powers, regulations and 
policies of the industry, there is some probability,;>.., that the government 
will change or even eliminate those rules and policies. In the extrane these 
possible changes will eliminate the total value of the asset and, at the very 
least, the future returns and value of the asset would be reduced. 
This type of risk might be described as "policy risk". Its magnitude 
is based upon the uncertain predictions of future government policy change or 
regulatory board decisions, not on the more familiar basis of an historical 
time series of returns variability. This risk, that the return some period 
might with probability ;>.. be negative and as large as the asset price itself, 
affects the expected value of the asset instead of the variance of its future 
returns, the risk incorporated in the discount rate. As such, it is analogous 
to the default risk faced by international lenders, notably comrrercial banks 
lending to foreign governments as analyzed recently by Eaton and Gersovitz 
(1981) and Kletzer (1984). Just as a poor country may default on the repayment 
of its international borrowings with some probability, lowering the expected 
value of the lender's portfolio, so may a government change its agricultural 
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policy with some probability, reking the quota purchaser's investment worthless 
in that situation and reducing its expected value in any case.? 
This situation can be modelled nost sinply by making this default risk 
discrete - either the quota.regine is scrapped causing the loss of the quota 
value itself, or it is mintained, with the flow of benefits as described in 
(3). This adds a default term to our value equation, and with each situation 
weighted by its respective probability we arr.ive at (5), the expected value of 
the quota, 
N 
PQ = (1 - A)F E 
i = 0 
where A is the probability that the quota scheme will be scrapped, causing 
rents, R, to fall to zero.8 
Nothing has yet been mentioned of the remaining variable in this 
expected value equation, the time horizon of the investrnent, N. How we 
interpret and treat this variable is not independent of how we handle default 
risk. In the discussion above, the quota's risk is broken into two corrponents. 
Systemtic risk is incorporated via some risk premium in the discount rate, and 
default risk is included as a probability >. affecting the quota's expected 
value. The expected life of the quota was inplicitly assumed to be a very 
large nunber. For reasons of sirrplicity and because we have no clear 
information to the contrary, we procede assuming an asset life of infinity. 
Alternatively, one could express the default risk not by this paraireter 
but by shortening the expected asset life (planning horizon) to some finite 
nunber of years. This procedure is artificial in one sense because an increase 
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in perceived default risk will appear as if the planning horizon was shortened 
despite no actual change in expected asset life. But it does have the 
intuitive appeal of corresponding to the notion of a "payback perioo" and for 
our purpose of estimating R from values of Po these two alternative depictions 
of default risk are alm::>st equivalent. In the errpirical part of the paper, 
calculations of this payback perioo will also be presented. 
With an infinite time horizon, equation (5) can be sirrplified, and 
collecting tenns it becomes (6) 
(1 - A) F 
(6) 
r + A- g 
Applying this IOOdel of quota pricing to determine industry supply price 
in a corrpetitive environment, we can incorporate the tax benefits of quota 
ownership as discussed earlier by deflating the cbserved quota price by the 
present value of the tax advantage. If we denote this adjusted quota price as 
Pfro, we can express equation (6j directly in tenns of marginal proouction rents 
R. '!be supply price, C, is the output price less the proouction rent, and R is 
given in (7) by rearranging (6). 
(7) 
If we let r* = r + A... g , our operational equation R = r*Prdr · l - A -.r·· lS 
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similar to the standard procedure (R = iPo) initially criticized. The 
difference is in the structure and errpirical choice involved in the right hand 
side variables. It would be fortuitous if a nominal marke:. interest rate was 
the appropriate value for r*. 
To illustrate the application of these conceptual tools to an enpirical 
situation, we will examine fluid milk quotas in the British Colunbia dairy 
industry in 1980 to determine the supply price of milk at that tine. The 
advant~ges of this particular errpirical application are that the B.C. fluid 
quota market includes most of the features noted above, we are able to measure 
the default risk of the quota, conditional upon discount rates chosen, and this 
market features the highest price of fluid quota in Canada. 
~.i;Qru The B,c, Milk Irrlust_zy 
Before proceeding with quantifying equation (5) , a few details on the 
institutional structure of the B.C. dairy industry may be in order. As with 
most dairy industries, there is a two part market for milk, a fluid or fresh 
milk ("Class I") market and a manufactured or industrial milk market, producing 
cheese, butter, ice cream and skim milk powder. Virtually all prcx:lucers ship 
to both markets and health or quality standards are likewise the sarre. Farm 
prices paid for fluid milk are fornu.ila determined, and the seven conponent in­
dices reflect movement in general inflation, wages and salaries, and a selec­
tion of milk inputs. The formula is constructed as a ten year moving average 
and consequently the milk price is reasonably straightforward to predict. 
Because the fluid price is attractive, access to this market is restricted by 
fluid milk quotas. Individuals face relatively few barriers to the transfer of 
quota between farms, subject to certain minirrurn levels on the size of the 
transaction and a five year holding period before resale. Consequently, an 
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active market exists, including a nurrber of quota brokers. 
'!be industrial (nanufacturing) milk price is also determined by a for­
nula, this time at the federal level, and although this price is considerably 
lower than the B.C. fluid price, it is still.sufficiently attractive to B.C. 
milk producers to require additional quota restrictions to keep total B.C. pro­
duction of industrial milk within the province's allocated quota. This quota, 
called market sharing quota or MSQ, is distinct from fluid quota (although not 
unrelated, as will be seen later). These regulations put all of a producer's 
output under the constraint of a quota although this was not always so. B.C. 
only entered the national milk supply nanagement scheme, under which authority 
for MSQ exists, in 1973 and the provincial MSQ allocation became a binding con­
straint only in 1975. This detail is irrportant, as it later provides us with 
the means of calculating the discount rate. Unlike fluid quota in B.C. or MSQ 
in Alberta, Cntario and Q..Jebec, MSQ in B.C. is not traded but allocated admin­
istratively on the basis of a variety of criteria. 
Cne of these criteria is relevant to the denand for fluid quota because 
since 1976 some MSQ has been provided free of charge to certain fluid quota 
purchases. To ensure-a nargin of flexibility to dairymen in meeting their 
fluid quota, given the inevitable production fluctuations due to weather, herd 
health, or other biological factors, the Board has usually promised fluid quota 
purchasers whatever additional MSQ is necessary (if any) to cover milk produc­
tion of 10 percent above their new fluid quota holding. Like the tax provision 
noted earlier, this rule provides an additional benefit to fluid quota buyers, 
increasing the value of F. Also, this benefit will be most valuable to those 
producers who qualify for the full 10 percent MSQ allocation (and who can be 
expected to dominate the narket). If we assurre that MSQ is as valuable as fluid 
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quota (likely an upward biased estirrate of MSQ value because the corresponding 
milk price is only .seventy percent of the fluid milk price), then this benefit 
is worth one-tenth of the value of fluid quota. If this does overstate the 
value of the benefit we will understate the production rent and overstate the 
supply price by an amount less than 10 percent. 
Now we turn to determining the values of P1ro, g, r and ). for equation 
(7) • Both Po and g can be determined with quota price data generated in the 
fluid quota market for the Lower Fraser Valley region, the major dairy
I 
production region of B.C. As data from this market are the enpirical backbone 
of the paper sore discussion of their nature and accuracy may be useful. 
Sllbject to mininurn transaction size and resale restrictions, fluid quota 
transfers relatively freely among producers (usually through the iriternediary 
of a broker). '!be regulatory body, the Milk Board, neither taxes nor otherwise 
controls the terms of the transaction. '!be data we use are gross of brokerage 
fees and collected ultimately from the brokers themselves. Since 1978 the 
provincial Ministry of Agriculture and Food has collected these data on a 
monthly basis, published with a series of ob'1er input prices, while those for 
1971-1977 were collected directly by the author and Grubel and Schwindt (1977). 
Annual averages and rates of change are found. in Appendix 1. '!be nurrber of 
traders and transactions indicate that prices are carpetitively determined, 
and information about these prices is possessed widely enough to result in a 
low dispersion of transaction prices each nonth. 9,10 
In conclusion, these data appear to be reasonably clean and appropriate 
for our purpose. hly periodic noise in monthly figures will be minimized by 
our use of annual averages. '!be average quota price observed in 1980 is $155 
per pound of daily production, or $96.44 per annual hectolitre, corresponding 
to our variable Po. 
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This value IIUst now be adjusted to p,rQ in order to take into account 
the two benefits which distinguish F from R. The first adjustnent is necessary 
to account for the capitalization of tax benefits accruing to quota purchasers. 
&cpirical esti.rcates of the present value of this tax saving (equation 4) are 
between 1.75 and 1.78 percent of the purchase price (Barichello and Glenday, 
1983). When the stock price is deflated by the mean estirrate it becomes $94.77. 
A second adjustment is needed to account for the capitalization of the 
benefit of free MSQ allocation to quota buyers. Valuing this benefit at 10 
percent of the value of fluid quota as argued above, ooserved quota prices 
should be deflated by 1.1, yielding an adjusted quota stock price of $86.15. 
This price corresponds to p,rQ of equation (7) and is the average market price 
purged of both tax and MSQ benefits to reflect only production rents, R. 
'!he value of g, the expected rate of capital gain, could be determined 
from the time path of net returns, but because it is unavailable for this 
period we rely upon the time series of quota prices. However, the striking 
characteristic of this price series is its erratic nature, especially when seen 
in real terms. The year to year change in real price has ranged from -17 to +49 
percent within the 1971 to 1983 period, all of this in an industry with a 
stable pricing formula and sustained but gradual inprovements in technology. 
The negative real price changes have been usually associated with rapid 
increases in an input price, such as grain prices (1973) or interest rates 
(1981-82), and the nost dram:1.tic increases in real price occurred with the 
initial (1975) inposition of and subsequent (1978, 1983) cutbacks in MSQ. 
This price change series does pose a challenge for the formation of 
expectations of future capital gains. Because we have no d::>servations on the 
actual expectations process of narket participants, we assume it displays the 
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following characteristics. First, with this history of unanticipated events 
and large resulting quota price response in both directions, producers are 
asswned to place a snall weight on any one year's experience. '!his is 
equivalent to considering a long series of price changes to keep srrall the 
inpact of any one year's new price change infornation. Secondly, because 
recent price changes do little to depreciate the value of older price change 
infornation, we assume that all have some relevance and that the weight given 
to each ct>servation falls modestly from new to older d:>servations. Finally, if 
some event is considered sufficiently rare or unique, it may receive a 
particularly low weight in the expectation. It may generally be difficult to 
define a unique event, but one such exanple would seem to be clear in this time 
series. 
One method of incorporating these considerations in a systematic and 
straightforward manner is to use geometrically declining weights for the nine 
years of available price change data (1972 to 1980), beginning with the rrost 
recent (1980) ct>servation. '!be expected value of g is then approximated from 
this series as 
g .. r
g 
i .. 1 
with i = 1 representing 1980, sunming back in time to 1972. To keep the time
•profile of weights (k 1 ) relatively flat we choose k = 0.95. When surveying the 
1971-1980 period, one event stands out as a unique occurrence for the B.C. milkI 
market, the initial introduction of the industrial milk quota (MSQ). Although 
this federal program, including quotas, was introduced earlier, MSQ became a 
binding constraint on B.C. milk producers only during 1975. It forced many 
producers to reduce output or purchase fluid quota, resulting in a dranatic 
junp in fluid quota prices which industry participants have sli:>sequently viewed 
as a me-time event. 'lberefore, we have reduced the weight applied to this 
1975 ct>servation to one-half of what it otherwise would be. 
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When awlied to the data of Appendix I, these procedures give for 1980 
a long run expected rate of real capital gain of 8.0 percent. With a price 
series as variable as this, some of the different possible expectations models 
can produce quite different values for g. In fact, with this pattern of prices 
these differences are likely to be found across individual producers as well. 
We have opted for a systematic and sinple model instead of a more ad hoc 
procedure which incorporates nuch additional judgmental infornation.11 
Nevertheless, the possibility of error here in estinating g is clear, and 
sensitivity tests will be undertaken. 
'lbroughout the history of this marketing board reg:ine, there have been 
increases in aggregate quota, system-wide, in response to demand growth, sone 
of which has been alloated without charge to existing producers. Allocation is 
prq>ortional to milk production in excess of one's fluid quota, essentially 
<:lle's industrial milk production. Although new allocations are not made with 
explicit reference to fluid quota holdings, the close neasured relation between 
fluid quota milk and excess milk production (consistent with excess production 
being chosen as some fraction of fluid quota production) neans that larger 
fluid quota holdings will typically attract larger new quota allocations. Data 
from 1974 to 1977 on new quota added to the system, adjusted for allocations to 
existing producers, and weighted with gearetrically declining weights as 
described above-, gives an expected percentage increase in the quantity of fluid 
quota of 1.25 percent. When added to the expected real price appreciation of 8 
percent we arrive at g = 0.0925 for the expected rate of capital gain. 
Measuring·the-Disccxmt·Rate 
'!here remains the task of determining rand A, measured in real terms 
to be consistent with g. We are able to do this by considering the period 
prior to the effective inposition of MSQ, when production at the nargin was 
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uncontrolled and from which we can cbserve both rents and quota prices. This 
allows calculation of r*, the inverse of the price-eamin;. ~ .ratio, but we do 
not have enough infornation to identify both r and >. • As a result, we will 
assume a value of r and calculate the inplied prcbability of default. To 
choose a value of r, we begin with Jenkin's estinate of the private real cost 
of capital in Canada, 6 percent, the opportunity return on capital of all risks 
facing farmers, averaged across sectors and over the mid-1960's to mid-1970's 
decade. 12 However, on the basis of our earlier discussion of systematic quota 
risk, the possibility of incoopletely diversified unsystenatic risk, and the 
evidence of apparently fluctuating net returns shown in Appeooix 1, we choose a 
value larger than this average, namely 8 percent. 
Olr cbservations on r*, the earnings-price ratio, are possible due to 
fortuitous changes in policies and institutional rules dnring this period. 
Prior to B.C. 's entry into the federal market sharing program (late 1973), 
there was no constraint on the production of Wustrial milk, or more 
specifically to the dairy producer, no limit on his production in excess of his 
fluid quota ("excess milk"). With a two price system and a quota on fluid 
milk, the industry could be described with Figure 2, deleting for now any 
reference to the denand side. 
p 
- QQ Ql 
Figure 2 
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'lbe price of fluid quota milk, PCJ-1, is exogenously determined by the 
pricing fornula of the Milk Board, the fluid quota level is noted by O, and all 
milk produced in excess of Qreceives the excess milk price, PEM, the result of 
exogenous federal goverrurent support prices for industrial milk products. With 
supply curve So, production occurs at level Qi, of which Qis fluid milk and 
{Qi - Q) is excess milk. In this situation, the current production rent R is 
no longer the unobservable P-C of Figure 1. R is still price less rrarginal 
cost (supply price) but this is now the observable quota milk - excess milk 
price differential, AC in Figure 2. 
I£, however, the supply curve is described by S1, (PCJ-1 - Pm) will 
overstate the rent R. Under these circunstances the quota rent will be AB < AC 
and we are once again left with an und:>servable rragnitude for R. To identify R 
we nust be able to distinguish enpirically those periods when the supply curve 
is characterized by So and those by s1. Over the longer term (say, year to 
year) if So applies, at output level Qthe price of excess milk exceeds its 
supply price. Production would be e.xpanded and we would expect to find a 
significant volume of excess milk, OJ. - Q. 
'lbe level of excess production which could be terned "significant" is 
difficult to.establish, if only because the supply curve is likely to be 
shifting back and forth over tine with changes in input prices and clirratic 
factors. In addition there is a conplication from fluid quota allocation rules 
which penalize a producer for producing less milk than his quota allotment for 
specified periods during two consecutive years. Because the penalty is a loss 
of fluid quota, stochastic influences on production give producers 
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an incentive to maintain a certain margin of production above quota 
requirements. 'lhe allocation of MSQ is instructive in determining this margin. 
To provide this safety in neeting fluid quota requirements, quota purchasers 
are allocated enough MSQ to cover excess production of 10% above their fluid 
quota. 
Over the 1971 to 1975 period, excess production averaged 29% of the 
quantity of quota milk produced, ranging by years from 26 to 30 percent. Even 
if we allow for twice the 10% insurance margin considered appropriate by the 
MSQ allocation policy, we still find that actual excess production is above 
this higher margin. Given the stability of milk production, a margin of thirty 
percent of production as insurance to maintain fluid quota levels is both ex­
cessive and highly unlikely. Excess milk prices were high enough relative to 
the supply curve to encourage a significant production of milk over and above 
fluid quota levels. 'lherefore, it seems clear that on average the supply curve 
from 1971 to 1975 can be depicted by So in Fig. 2. 
For shorter periods t.ha11 a year, before any. substa.11tial decrease in 
production would becorre widespread, the suwly curve could shift to an S1 
position. Hard evidence for this is not available, but any large price 
increase in one or more inportant inputs Su;:Jgests the possibility. Over the 
1971-75 period, the large increases in real prices of dairy feed (+48%) and hay 
(+52%) which occurred in 1973 provide one such exanple. 'lhese nUIIbers, alo119 
with casual evidence from the industry of a serious cost-price squeeze, make it 
seem very likely that the first half of 1973 featured a supply curve in the 
position of S1. Later evidence supports this contention, and therefore we are 
unable to use the ct>servations for the first two quarters of 1973. 
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Milk narket conditions in B.C. changed st.i:>stantially during 1975. 
Despite the entry of B.C. into the MSQ program in Octcber 1973, the provincial 
industrial milk quota allotment (MSQ) did not represent a binding constraint to 
the province or individual producers until spring, 1975. At that time the 
large milk production growth induced by the earlier provincial st.i:>sidies (the 
Farm Income Assurance program discussed above) overcame the previously uninpor­
tant MSQ allotment and an increasing nurrber of producers becaire constrained by 
this second quota. lm.y production in excess of this MSQ would incur a penalty, 
offsetting the excess milk price, and this penalty increased until by 1976, the 
effective price for over-quota production was alm:>st zero. During 1975, the 
narginal price facing producers varied by farm depending upon whether the pro­
ducer was naking full use of his MSQ. By the second quarter of 1976, virtually 
all farmers were so constrained and sorre neasure of equilibrium was 
reestablished. 'lhe industry by then was clearly described by supply curve S1, 
and the rapid growth in fluid quota prices from the second quarter of 1975 to 
the second quarter of 1976 reflect the adjustment to this new situation. 'Ihis 
1975-76 period is relevant for us because it s1.13gests that supply curve So is 
descriptive of the B.C. dairy industry only to the first quarter of 1975. 
'!hereafter, from 1976 to date the suwly curve is better described by S1. MSQ 
production is effectively infranarginal and its price has no effect on quota 
values or industry equilibrium. 
Because we have both quota prices (adjusted) and production rents for 
this 1971-1975 period when S0 was descriptive of the S':JPPlY curve, we can 
calculate r*. It is worth recalling that this equation for r* assunes that 
subject to a growth rate, g, expected returns are constant in real terms over 
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time at the level of current production rents. With sone fifteen years of data 
on these net returns (the milk price differential) this assunption can be 
examined. First, real fluid milk prices have been kept approxinately constant 
by fornula, while real excess milk prices ·have tended to fall slightly from the 
late 1950's to the early 1970's. Aside from indicating the growth rate g of 
net returns, the data show that there was year to year variability in their 
level. Almost yearly, the real returns altemated between generally small 
increases and decreases, roostly the result of discontinuous changes in nominal 
price levels and variations in inflation. 'lbe 1970's data show attenuation of 
these changes, and provide general support for the assunption above, given our 
attention to the 1971-1975 period. 
But the variability of the data do alert us to the possibility that in 
some periods, say quarters, current conditions may have been seen to be 
unusual, such as from an unexpected policy or input cost change. Cbservations 
which represent such periods are not likely to form the basis for expected 
future returns and will be of questionable value to our sattple. en this basisi 
three cbservations are suspect for our purposes of estimating longer term 
default prcbabilities.13 
To corrplete our calculation of ). from the equation "= (r*-r+g)/(l+r*) 
we first assume that r = 0.08. To determine expected capital gains, g, over 
this early 1970's period we have drawn on the saire guiding principles 
elaborated earlier. However, because we have only two cbserved quota 
transactions to illustrate prices prior to 1971, we JtUst turn to the flow 
returns from the quota, the price difference between fluid quota milk and 
excess milk. 'lbese data are available from the beginning of the schere, 1956, 
but early years (1956-58) show erratic rrovements and are deleted. We are left 
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with 14 price changes over the 1959-1973 period before new federal and 
provincial policies altered both prices and regulations in 1974-75. Using 
geometrically declining weights as before, g as expected in 1973, midpoint of 
the 1971-75 period, is 1.8 percent per year. In addition, there were inportant 
quantity allocations of new quota. '!be expected percentage increase in new 
quota was estimated from annual data since 1967 on aggregate (system-wide) new 
quota increases, adjusted to percentage annual increases to existing prooucers 
and weighted with geometrically declining weights as described before. 'Ibis 
value, 1.4 percent per year, is added to the expected price increase of 1.8 
percent to arrive at a total expected capital gain of 3.2 percent. 
Finally, an adjustnent in the price of quota is again necessary to 
account for the tax benefit (TS of equation 4). 'Ibis provision was introduced 
in 1972 and quota prices have been adjusted in subsequent periods in the sane 
nanner as described earlier. 
Using available quarterly data from the third quarter of 1971 to the 
first quarter of 1975 we first adjust the quota price for the tax saving (TS), 
generating Po,calculate r* from R/Po, and finally >- , from (r*-r-tt3)/(l+r*) 
given g = 0.032 and r assumed to be 0.08. '!be results are shown in Table l. 
'!be mean value of r*, excluding the three d:>servations judged to be 
inapplicable (1973:I, 1973:II, 1974:r)l4 is 0.317. 'Ibis is a surprisingly 
large nurrber of discounting the future returns from an investnent,15 and is the 
evidence alluded to earlier which suggests that the purchase of fluid quota is 
seen to be a particularly risky investment. Conditional upon our estinated g 
(0.032) and asswned r (0.08) values, the inplied risk of default(>-) over this 
period averages 0.204 with standard 
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deviation 0.011 •. 'Ibis policy or default risk is equivalent to expecting that 
all rents from the quota regi.Ire will fall to zero with a one in five 
probability, given no interm:!diate option of a partial reduction in rents.16 
'lhe size of this expected default prooability is not sinply an artifact of.our 
values of r and g; in fact, '- is quite robust to changes in these parameters. 
For exanple, allowing r to vary between 0.06 and 0.10 and g between 0.02 and 
0.04 causes'- to fall within the range of 0.180 and 0.225, the forrrer value 
resulting from the higher discount rate corrbined with the lower growth rate, 
and conversely. 
An alternative and sinpler rrethod of expressing this risk, noted 
earlier, is in terms of the expected life of the asset. Asswning again that 
r = 0.08 and g = 0.032, but solving for N instead of specifying '- gives an 
inplied time h:>rizon (N) of 3.6 years. Farrrers holding these values of r and g 
will invest in fluid quota only if they can pay off the investment in at least 
3.6 years. 
Still, estLrnates of such large default risk raise the question of the 
plausibility of the belief that there is a one in five chance that the quota 
regime will be scrapped. Sorre program changes are clearly possible. An 
inportant source of these rents, the fluid milk pricing foITlllla, has been 
periodically the subject of political debate, and a series of h3riculture 
Ministers have publicly decried high and rising quota prices and quota 
transferability•. '!be dairy sli>sidy program (FIA) rrentioned earlier lasted only 
five years and paid a significant subsidy in two. Furthenoore, argurrents at 
public hearings and in the rredia for dismantling this milk policy regirre are 
often advanced by consurrer interests and economists. 'lherefore, a perception 
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of considerable policy risk, manifested in a large discount of future quota 
returns, would not appear surprising .17 
As large as this earnings-price ratio {r*) and policy risk apparently 
are, they are not without corrcborating evidence. from trade in other governnent 
"rights." 'Ibere is a well developed market for MSQ in Cntario {where MSQ can 
be traded) with few. restrictions on quota transferability. Because MSQ is an 
annual quota, once a unit of it is used in one year, it cannot be used again 
until the following year. 'lbe quota exchange of the Oltario Milk Marketing 
Board exploits this distinction and permits trading in two different types of 
MsQ, "used" and "unused." Using Ragain to denote the rents or returns to a
N Riunit of quota, unused MSQ will be valued as E i
i • 0 (l+r)
whereas used MSQ will be valued as
N 
E 
R1 • '!be difference in their prices will be. i
i • l (l+r) 
N Ri N Ri
E -- E -=Ro
i • 0 (l+r)i i = 1 (l+r) 1 
In other words, the difference in price between unused and usedMSQ will offer 
a direct ireasure of R, without the corrplications of having to know expected 
capital gains, the discount rate or the time horizon. 
'Ibis MSQ exchange only began operation in March 1980, so to allow 
transactions to reflect acquaintance with the operation of the narket we wish 
to ignore the data from the first months of the rrarket's operation. No trading 
in used MSQ occurs during August and Septeni:>er due to the.definition of the 
dairy year. Consequently we choose data from the new dairy year {which begins 
in August) , leaving us four ci:>servations (January data is generated by quota 
29 
bidding in Decerrber) from the 1980 calendar year. '!he average price difference 
between unused and used MSQ over this period was 10.25 cents per litre. Given 
an average MSQ (unused) price over the same period of 35.95 cents per litre, 
when adjusted by the expected tax saving, the earnings-price ratio (r*) is 29.0 
percent. If we assume values of rand g, we can determine the irrplied default 
risk • We can let r = 0.08 as before, but we have no infornation on expected 
capital gains experience, given the newness of the narket. If we assume a 
small real capital gain per year, say g = 0.02, the resulting >.. is 0.18. 
Alternatively, the inplied time horizon using the same rand g values, setting 
A= 0 and solving for N is 4 years • 
.Admittedly these data are for a different province, time period and 
asset, industrial milk quota in 1980 in Cntario instead of fluid milk quota in 
the 1971-75 period in British ColUIIbia, but the apparent default risks and 
earnings-price ratios are renarkably similar. 'Ihese <l'ltario data, by offering 
direct infornation on Rand r*, offer some support for our less direct measure 
of r* of B.Ce; a~d support clearly the notion that these milk quotas are assets 
with considerable perceived risk. Casual evidence to support these results, 
that milk quota in Cntario and B.C. is risky enough to require a planning 
horizon of about four years is also found in Broadwith & Hughes (1979) and 
Arcus (1977) • 
Poultry production in canada is also regulated by quotas and these 
narkets can provide additional verification of our results. Despite. 
difficulties in Raking accurate quota price ooservations due to thin narkets 
and restrictions on quota transfer in some jurisdictions, the quota can be 
rented in the (ntario broiler and egg narkets. '!his gives us a direct measure 
of r* and subject to the 
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difficulties of determining expected growth rates in quota prices, we can 
estinate the default risk for each rrarket, albeit with less confidence than in 
the case of the dairy rrarkets. 
For Ontario egg quotas we have eight years of quota price ct>servations 
and five years of ct>servations on rental prices. '!he earnings-price ratio, r*, 
averages 0.18 over the 1978-81 period. Capital gains experience has been more 
erratic here, and apparently increasing over time, but using g = 0.10 and r = 
0.08, we d::>tain an estimated A of 0.17. In the Ontario broiler rrarket we have 
quota price data from 1976 to 1983, generating an expected annual capital gain 
of O.14 by the same nethods of calculation as already discussed. For the 
single year, 1983, we have an earnings-price ratio, r*, of 0.1514, resulting in 
an estirrated ). of 0.18. Despite admittedly noisy data and the apparently 
large influence of capital gains, these rrarkets also show quota purchasers to 
discount future returns heavily and quota prices errbody a perceived default 
risk of between one in five and one in six. 
Finally, there is consistent evidence from an entirely different 
jurisdiction, the case of North Carolina tct>acco allotnents. Seagraves (1969) 
has estimated the rate of return or discount rate (approximately r* in our 
terminology) on these td::>acco allotnents, and from 1945 to 1962 this discount 
rate averaged 26 percent. His estimates also revealed an interesting related 
phenomenon, that the discount rate has generally been falling over time, to 
average 16 percent in the last ten years of his data. We are unable to test 
this trend with our limited nunber of years of B.C. data, but we see that such 
a trend could arise from a reduced prct>ability of default, increased 
expectation of capital gains or increased diversification. 'Ibis result also 
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suggests some caution in applying a discount rate estimated at one point in 
time to quota market data sare years later. 
ea,1cu1at~ Sup,pzy Price 
We are now in a position to solve ·equation (7) for the annual produc­
tion rent, R, in the year 1980 for the B.C. dairy industry. 'Ibis aroounts to 
calculating r* for 1980, and because we know Po(= $86.15 per hectolitre), we 
can calculate the annual rent R per hectolitre of milk • our estimate of g is 
0.0925 and we continue to assune r to be 0.08 and N to be infinity. We apply 
the default prd:>ability estimated in the 1971-75 period ( :>. = 0.204) to this 
1980 market on the assUIIption that this parameter has not changed over this 
period. Ch the basis of these rnean values, r* = 0.2406, and the annual rent, 
R, is calculated to be $20.73 per annual hectolitre of milk produced (or quota 
rented). Given that the price of quota milk (P0n) was $42.16, the aggrEcqate 
supply price (C) is calculated to be $21.43 per hl. 'Ibis value gives the 
striking result that virtually one-half of the price of fluid milk paid to B.C. 
producers goes toward the cost (rent) of the quota and the remaining one-half 
pays for the cost of real inputs. 
'lhese results, however, are based upon point estimates of parameters 
neasured with possible error. Considering a range of likely rand g values for 
the 1971-75 period, :>. was earlier estimated to lie within the range (0.18, 
0.225). hJain we will consider the value of r to lie in the range (0.06, 
0.10), and to cover a wide range of possible expectations of future real 
capital gains, we let g vary between 0.07 and 0.11. 'lhis variation in 
parameters places bounds on r* of (0.207, 0.277). In turn, the rent R will lie 
between $17.86 and $23.90, and the resulting supply price, C, is between $18.26 
and $24.30 per hectolitre. 
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Cnce again, the Ontario MSQ rrarket data offers corroboration. Recall 
that the production rent, R, was rreasured directly as $10.25/hl. Given an 
average industrial milk price of $32.76, the supply price of milk in Ontario in 
1980 was $22.51/hl. 'Ibis value is calculated directly, without reference to 
capital gains issues or estinated discount rates, default risks, and so forth. 
'!he similarity of this value of our estinate of the B.C. supply price is 
encouraging, despite differences in production conditions between the two 
' 
regions. However, given the range of possible supply prices in B.C. noted 
above, we have insufficient precision in our rrean estirrate to conclude that 
B.C. producers have lower costs at the rrargin than their Ontario counterparts. 
Finally, recently collected average variable cost data for a sanple of 
these B.C. milk producers for the year 1981 provides an additional data source 
with which to test our results. When we take the largest one-third of sanpled 
farms, on the assurrption that these are the firms buying quota, and deflate 
their costs back to 1980 at the rate of inflation (12.5) percent, we ootain a 
cost estimate of $22.16/hl. This estinate represents average variable, not 
narginal costs, and errbodies an assurrption of constant costs between 1981 and 
1980, but nevertheless is sufficiently close to our estirrate to constitute an 
additional rreasure of support. 
It is useful at this point to contrast these results with the results 
one would ootain by applying the standard m:>del, where R = iPo. '!he average 
(naninal) interest rate on farm debt across Canada was 12 percent in 1980, and 
the average rrarket price of quota (unadjusted) was $96.44~ '!he resulting annual 
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rent to the quota is then $11. 57/hl., cq:;proxinately one-ha. ~ of the value cb­
tained with the IOOdel SlXjgested in this paper. Similarly, the calculated sup­
ply price would then be $30.60/hl., forty percent above our estinate. such an 
estinate suggests not only the inplausible result that B.C. milk producers are 
nuch less efficient at the margin than their Oltario counterparts, but that 
narginal costs are so close to the price of MSQ milk that there would be little 
value to that quota and little demand for it. In fact, there is considerable 
excess demand for this· (untraded) quota and despite sizeable penalties there is 
production in excess of it. 
9mlY.fil.QD 
It is the purpose of this paper to give some illustration of the 
infornation which can be provided by the market for a goverrurent right, in this 
case, an agricultural marketing quota. Not only can the private value placed 
on this quota provide a barorreter of the general profitability of the iooustry 
but it can also disclose specific infornation about otherwise unci:>served 
industry supply conditions, such as the industry supply price. 
In our atterrpts to estimate this supply price, however, it has becorre 
apparent that the analysis of the quota nay involve-considerable conplexity. 
Multiplying observed quota prices by a market interest rate, as is normally 
found in the literature, does not appear to do justice to the subtleties of 
_ quota ownership, and certainly yields very different results from the analysis 
we propose. For exanple the quota is an asset about which there may ·be a 
perception of considerable risk, especially the policy or default risk of 
possible changes in or elimination of the profitable quota regime. It may 
possess the prospect of earning increasing production rents, hence capital 
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gains, over time, as well as additional benefits such as tax advantages. 
Ehpirical inplenentation of this more detailed IOOdel required both 
additional data and institutional detail, particularly in determining the 
prooability of default and earnings:-price ratio ("discount rate") • Cnly 
through fortuitous policy changes were we able to obtain neasures of this risk 
involved in holding fluid quota in the B.C. milk industry, and that evidence 
nay be unavailable in some jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, it was feasible in the case of the B.C. milk industry to 
obtain estimates of allrost all required paraneters and the results are 
corroborated by a variety of additional evidence. First, our results show that 
B.C. fluid milk quota is perceived to be a very risky asset, with an 
earnings-price ratio of 32 percent. By assuming a discount rate of 8 percent 
enbodying a risk premium for systematic risk and the possibility of any 
underdiversified nonsystenatic risk, we estimated a perceived probability of 
default, that the mnopoly rents of the quota system would end, of 20 percent. 
More direct evidence from the Chtario industrial milk market produces a very 
similar result (an earnings-price ratio of 29 percent, or a default prooability 
of 18 percent), providing errpirical support for both our result and our less 
direct calculation procedure. Similar results were suggested by data from 
Cntario poultry narkets. '!be annual rent earned by B.C. fluid quota averages 
__ $21/hl. in 1980, about one-half the price of fluid quota milk, and this 
contrasts with the result of $12/hl. obtained with the sirrple IOOdel of quota 
valuation. 
'lhe resulting supply price for milk in B.C. is calculated to be almost 
$21.50/hl. in 1980. 'Ibis is supported by the conparable value of $22.SO/hl. 
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in Oltario, arrived at without need for data on discount rates, capital gains 
or other benefits. In addition, average variable cost data from 1981 for the 
largest third of sanpled farms, deflated back to 1980 dollars, gives a value of 
$22.16/hl. Given the transfer of production knowledge and genetic material 
across Canada, the Oltario data is likely to represent a better yardstick of 
conparison, and they provide support for both the B.C. supply price estina.te 
and the quota valuation rrooel. 'lhese nurrbers contrast sharply with the result 
d:>tained from the sirrple rrodel, where the B.C. suwly price is estirrated at 
$31/hl., a clearly in-plausible estinate given the excess demand for industrial 
milk quota. 
Although we are encouraged by what enpirical support we have for our 
estimates, it should be cbvious that we can claim no pt"ecision in the supply 
price estimation undertaken here. '!he results are best interpreted as point 
estimates, and four sources of possible error can be identified. Given the 
erratic nature of the capital gains series, the estimate of g is sensitive to 
the expectations process assumed, hence may introduce error. Second, the 
estimate of default risk (A) used for 1980 was cbtained from 1971 - 1975 data 
and it is possible that it may have changed over the period. '!bird, the choice 
of discount rate used in initially estimating A and sli>sequently estimating 
the quota rent may have introduced a small error because the.resulting supply 
--price is not independent of the discount rate chosen. In the same vein, the 
results are slightly affected by the characterization of risk which is chosen. 
Fourth, the assunption of profit maximization with respect to quota purchase is 
made throughout the paper and if persistent errors are made over time, our 
results lose some of their significance. Finally, although we have considered 
benefits to the quota in addition to the production rent, there may be other 
factors we have missed. 
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A range of probable supply price estirrates was d:>tained by varying the 
parameter values of r, g and >. • Considering the discount rate between 0.06 
and 0.10, the rate of expected capital gains between 0.07 and 0.11, and the 
default risk probability between O.l80 and 0.225,, the resulting supply price 
ranged from $18.26/hl. to $24.30/hl., a fairly narrow range given the wide 
variation in parameter values. 'Ibis band could be narrowed by further work in 
this area, but it still shows the supply price to be well below the sinple 
model estirrate of $31/hl. 
What are now needed to test the realism of the procedures followed here 
(or the efficiency with which the quota market works) are alternative neasures 
of the quota rent or the supply price. '!here are several possible options 
here, including the collection of actual cost data, but they represent work for 
another paper. 
Finally, the results themselves suggest several inplications. First, 
the default risk which we have neasured for agricultural marketing quotas may 
be inportant in a variety of government programs which provide rents to certain 
groups, from inport quotas to farm price supports. Che might expect that a 
high discount of future returns (rents) takes place in arriving at the stock 
price incorporating these returns, be it an inport license or agricultural 
land. Second, the supply price estirrated may be on a new supply curve corrpared 
to the unregulated supply curve if the operations of the marketing board have 
changed real resource costs at the farm level. 'lhird, in contrast to clairrs 
that supply management marketing boards are socially efficient because they 
reduce price risk to farm producers, this work suggests that the boards create 
an inportant elenent of risk as well. Finally, the level of the supply price 
r 
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is inportant for determining both income transfers and efficiency effects of 
the regi.ne. Although these effects are not calculated here, the size of the 
quota rent makes clear that income transfers in this market are very large. 
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Footnotes 
1. Marketing boards are statutory institutions, formed in a nunber of 
developed and developing countries to intervene in prirrary product (usually 
agricultural) rrarkets. 'lbeir objectives are typically to "inprove" the 
narketing process, which often means controlling rrarket participants, 
stabilizing and sometimes increasing producer prices. See Hoos (1979) for 
international corrparisons of these boards. 
2. Although rrarketing boards are ptevalent in some developing 
countries, notably West Africa, this problem does not presently arise there. 
Marketing boards in those regions act roore to inpose an export tax, limiting 
domestic production by reducing the producer price. Cnly if producer prices 
were raised above equilibrium levels would quotas become a policy tool in 
those countries. 
3. Although Q is typically shown to be less than Oe, the quota rray 
be inposed at any level of output, greater or less than Oe. It effectively 
contrains output and becomes valuable when its associated output price exceeds 
the supply price, creating rents at the rrargin of production. 
4. It should be noted that g can take on negative as well as positive 
values. Although uncomoon, negative price appreciation has been observed in 
some years and over nulti-year periods in some jurisdictions. As well, recent 
Canadian dairy industry experience with a shrinking industrial milk rrarket has 
offered exanples of quota cutbacks, reducing individual quota holdings across 
the board. 
s. Confusion on this general issue of rrarginal versus infrarrarginal 
returns in analyzing quotas is illustrated in Department of Finance (1981) and 
(Barichello, 1982). 
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6. '!he added cost of planning and adjusting biological production 
systems to meet known annual or even m:>nthly quotas is one exanple of the 
reverse effect, shifting the supply curve to the left. When quota levels are 
altered, especially with short notice (as can be the case '-:,+=n demand changes 
unexpectedly), these planning and adjustment costs increase, shifting the 
supply curve further left. It would be interesting to test the hypothesis 
that whatever the increase in price stability caused by these marketing board 
·regimes, it is ootained at the expense of increased quantity instability. 
7. Kletzer raises another issue that would seem to have application 
to these quota-controlled markets (or any markets with significant governnent 
intervention) • Because the lender to a foreign government is likely to have 
less information than the borrower about the likelihood of default, the lender 
has an incentive to acquire more information. In quota markets, this 
translates as the farner having insufficient infornation about the likelihood 
of policy change by the government. It would be profitable for farmers to 
increase their infornation by becaning more involved with the goverrurent in 
the relevant policy areas. In fact, one ooserves in canada an increased 
demand for joint policy decision-naking between farm groups and the governnent 
in those areas where government intervention is greatest. 'Ibis ld::>by activity 
can then be explained as an attenpt to decrease the policy or default risk in 
addition to the more familiar atterrpt to increase farmers' returns or wealth. 
8. Note that this is analogous to pricing the quota as a call option. 
'lhe quota holder is "in the money" (in options terminology, the fublre stock 
price exceeds the exercise price) as long as the quota regime and rents are 
naintained, but if the quota scheme is scrapped, his quota asset is worthless 
like a call option when the stock price stays below the exercise price. 
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Assuming risk-neutrality, the current call price is the expected value of next 
periods price defined over •pseudo-prcbabilities", analogous to our A and 
1 - A • 
9. In five years of BOW' collection of individual prices, virtually 
all rronths show the range of prices within four percent of the mean value. 
10. Because of the conpetitive narket, visible quota prices and low 
transaction costs, save for the snaller farms for whom the mininum transaction 
size is a significant proportion of their production, there should be a stron:J 
tendency for the stock price of quota to be equated across farms. 'Ibis is 
consistent with the low dispersion in reported prices. '!be tendency toward 
equalizing narginal costs across firms, while present in the lon:J run, will be 
weaker in the short run due to possible differences across farms in the other 
variables of equation (6}, notably different expectations of capital gains and 
perception of the risk. 
11. It is encouraging that on the basis of personal experience in 
this industry I arrived at a similar figure (a more conservative 7 percent) 
using more arbitrary ad hoc procedures. 
12. 'Ibis is still consistent with earlier work by Jenkins (1972) where 
the rate of return in agriculture during the 1960's is estinated to be within 
the range of 5 to 7 percent. 
13. 'Ibis provides an additional argwrent for deleting the two 
observations noted earlier, but also draws attention to the first quarter of 
1974 when the FIA program was first introduced. Much uncertainty existed 
about the nature of the program and its effect on fluid quota, resulting in a 
noticeable increase in the inplied discount rate. (See Table 1). 'Ibis would 
appear to be a clear case of unusual circumstances leading to an added 
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discount of current returns and a resulting discount rate estinate of little 
value to us in measuring longer term default probabilities. 'lherefore, we do 
not include the 1974 first quarter observation when calculating the m:an value 
of r. 
14. Including all ooservations raises the average r* to 0.329, but 
increases the dispersion (measured by standard deviation) by more than 60 
percent to 0.030. 
15. By contrast, other asset narkets disclose inplied discount rates 
at mre familiar levels. Berck (1979) found that tinber cutting practices of 
o.s. Pacific Northwest lurrber conpanies inplied a real discount rate of 5 
percent. In addition, Johnson and Kaserman (1983) explored the private 
housing narket to determine the degree to which energy-saving investments were 
capitalized into the market price. 'lbe range of real discount rates inplied 
were 6.3 to 8.4 percent. 
16. Admitting these intermediate options would inply an even larger 
expected probability that ~ reduction in rents will occur. 
17. Past successes of the dairy ld::>by would do little to reduce this 
risk if continual difficulty was seen in nd::>ilizing fellow producers and 
persuading governments in an increasingly urban environment. 'Ibis perception 
appears to be held by many individual dairymen and particularly by those 
industry leaders who are active in lobby efforts. It is for this reason that 
we have nooelled the annual default prcbability as being independent of 
previous years' outcomes. 
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B.C. FI.llid Milk Qiota Prices and Price Changes, 1971-1983,
($ per daily pound, nominal values) 
QJota Price/lb .­ lbninal Percentage Real Percentage
Olange from Olange from
$ Previous -Year · Previous Year 
1971 $35.67
1972 37.80 + 6.0 + 1.01973 36.80 - 2.6 -11.7
1974 36.32 - 1.3 -16.6
1975 57.98 +59.6 +48.91976 76.57 +32,1 +22.6
1977 93.03 +21.5 +14.4
1978 121.31 +30.4 +23.9
1979 137.57 +13.4 + 3.1
1980 155.07 +12.7 + 1.61981 150.51 - 2.9 -13.01982 155.28 + 3.2 - 7.51983 200 +29 +20 
Source: Grubel and Schwindt (1977), B.C. Ministry of Agriculture and Food,
Month)3 -Iwt,tt :Cost -survey, 1979 to 1983, private camunication with




Net Returns, Prices, "Discount Rates" and Implied Default Probabilities C\) 
for B.C. Fluid Milk Quota 
1971 - 1975, R and P0 in $/hl, 1971 dollars 
Quarter R * Po r* X 
1971 ·III 7.05 23.05 0.306 0.197 
'IV - 6.79 20.96 0.324 0.208 
1972 I 6.88 23.42 0.294 0.190 
II 7 .13 23.42 0.304 0.197 . 
III 7.03 21.08 0.334 0.214 
.. 
IV 7.43 21.37 0.348 0.222 
1973 I 7.97 20.47 0.389 0.246 
II 7.57 20.91 0.362 0.231 
III 6.82 20.68 0.330 0.212 
IV 5.59 18.39 0.304 0.196 
1974 I 6.94 18.36 0.378 0.240 
II 6~61 19.45 0.31-10 0.218 
III 5.20 17-96 0.289 0.187 
.. IV 5.07 16.16 0.314 0.202 
1975 I 5.47 17.35 0.315 0.203 
